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Abstract—Independent Configurable Architecture for 
Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems (ICAROUS) is a 
distributed software architecture developed by NASA Langley 
Research Center to enable safe autonomous UAS operations. 
ICAROUS consists of a collection formally verified core 
algorithms for path planning, traffic avoidance, geofence 
handling, and decision making that interface with an autopilot 
system through a publisher-subscriber middleware. The 
ICAROUS Sense and Avoid Characterization (ISAAC) test was 
designed to evaluate the performance of the onboard Sense and 
Avoid (SAA) capability to detect potential conflicts with other 
aircraft and autonomously maneuver to avoid collisions, while 
remaining within the airspace boundaries of the mission. The 
ISAAC tests evaluated the impact of separation distances and 
alerting times on SAA performance. A preliminary analysis of the 
effects of each parameter on key measures of performance is 
conducted, informing the choice of appropriate parameter values 
for different small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) 
applications. Furthermore, low-power Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is evaluated for potential use to 
enable autonomous sUAS to sUAS deconflictions as well as to 
provide usable warnings for manned aircraft without saturating 
the frequency spectrum. 
Keywords—small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS); sense and 
avoid (SAA); detect and avoid (DAA); unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV); Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)   
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Commercial applications of unmanned aircraft operating at 
low altitudes are likely to increase in the near future presenting 
both business incentives as well as huge airspace integration 
challenges. The full range of these low-altitude Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations will likely include [1] 
“…those that are fully contained in uncontrolled airspace, to 
those that require transit across the boundary between 
controlled and uncontrolled airspace, and finally to those that 
originate and operate within controlled airspace …” As a result, 
scenarios in which UAS will operate in close proximity to each 
other or with other users of the airspace will be increasingly 
common, such as in the vicinity of a terminal area. 
Consequently, the ability of small UAS vehicles to sense 
traffic aircraft in the airspace and maintain a safe separation 
distance from other vehicles is a fundamental requirement to the 
integration of UAS into the National Airspace System. Research 
on sense and avoid (also referred to as detect and avoid or DAA) 
for small UAS has focused mostly on development of separation 
assurance algorithms. Published research provides very little or 
no validation of these systems in a real-life setting. Furthermore, 
available sense and avoid algorithms for small UAS are often 
geared towards providing traffic awareness to remote pilots to 
maintain well clear, but do not consider the post-conflict 
maneuvers required to guide the vehicle back to the original 
path.  
This paper details the results of various tests (both simulation 
and flight tests) conducted to evaluate and validate the sense and 
avoid capability of the Independent Configurable Architecture 
for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems (ICAROUS). 
ICAROUS was designed as a distributed publish-subscribe 
software architecture to enable the easy integration of mission-
specific functionality and/or sensor technologies. Presently, 
ICAROUS runs onboard the vehicle on a companion computer 
but future instantiations of ICAROUS could be directly 
integrated with lower-level autopilot functions. Simulation 
testing enabled performance evaluation against a wide variety of 
well-clear parameters, initial conditions, and encounter 
geometries. Flight testing was used to validate simulation results 
and demonstrate ICAROUS as a practical, usable system for real 
world UAS applications. Flight tests were conducted against an 
unmanned fixed wing aircraft to validate scenarios involving 
low closure rate encounters with other unmanned aircraft 
vehicles. A manned general aviation (GA) aircraft was used to 
validate the sense and avoid capability in a high closure rate 
scenario representative of encounters between UAS and GA 
aircraft in a terminal area setting.  
Two additional goals of this effort were to evaluate the 
efficacy of a representative Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) receiver for sUAS as a source of 
cooperative traffic surveillance for Sense and Avoid (SAA) 
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applications and to investigate the use of reduced-power ADS-
B position report transmissions for low-altitude sUAS 
operations. While the widespread use of ADS-B is not 
considered feasible for sUAS due to potential frequency 
congestion, low power ADS-B has the potential to enable these 
operations without negatively impacting the air traffic system. 
To be a viable approach, ADS-B output power must be 
significantly reduced while maintaining the range and quality 
needed for small UAS operations in addition to providing useful 
warnings to manned aircraft. If the use of ADS-B does not 
provide useful alerts to manned aircraft, then there would be no 
justification for its use for UAS. Multiple levels of attenuated 
ADS-B output were tested during this effort with both sUAS to 
sUAS as well as sUAS to manned aircraft to evaluate low power 
ADS-B as a solution to this problem. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of existing research related to sense and avoid. Section 
III provides background on the ICAROUS architecture and the 
Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
(DAIDALUS), which is used by ICAROUS. This section also 
includes background on the Minimum Operational Performance 
Standards (MOPS) used to evaluate ICAROUS maneuvers and 
on the sensors used by UAS in sense and avoid (SAA) 
operations. Section IV discusses methods used for simulation 
and testing of ICAROUS. Section V provides a detailed analysis 
of ICAROUS’ performance with varied input parameters, and of 
the effectiveness of low power ADS-B. Finally, sections VI-VII 
provide a discussion of observed results, future work, and 
conclusions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Collision avoidance for manned aircraft has been an area of 
intense research since the advent of the Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS). The TCAS system was developed 
to provide pilots with adequate information to make decisions 
regarding evasive maneuvers to mitigate risk due to an intruder 
in the airspace [2]. The TCAS system has seen several iterations 
and continues to be the backbone of collision avoidance in the 
civil commercial aviation community. Using transponders, 
TCAS I provides warnings (traffic advisories) of nearby 
intruders in the airspace. The TCAS II system also provides 
resolution advisories to the pilot in addition to the traffic 
advisories. In case of a resolution advisory, the pilot has the final 
authority and is required to implement these resolutions. 
The Advanced Collision Avoidance System (ACAS-X) [3], 
the next generation of collision avoidance algorithms, was 
introduced with the objective of replacing TCAS. Unlike TCAS, 
ACAS-X uses a model-based decision-theoretic framework 
where traffic resolutions and advisories are optimized using a 
reward function that considers the encounter dynamics. The use 
of a decision-theoretic framework introduces multi-dimensional 
lookup tables thus making its implementation as well as its 
verification and validation a challenging task. Verification and 
validation of ACAS-X resolutions is an ongoing research 
activity [4]. 
Unlike manned aircraft operating at high altitudes, small 
UAS have different mission dependent performance constraints. 
Consequently, a straightforward translation of the collision 
avoidance algorithms used for manned aircraft may not be 
applicable. Collision avoidance algorithms for small UAS need 
to be cognizant of various constraints such as geofences and 
obstacles in a low altitude airspace or an urban airspace 
environment. Integration of detect and avoid capability with 
path planning capability was discussed in [5].  
For UAS, the final report of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Sense and Avoid (SAA) Workshop [6] 
defines the concept of sense and avoid as “the capability of a 
UAS to remain well clear from and avoid collisions with other 
airborne traffic.” Based on this definition, the UAS Sense and 
Avoid Science and Research Panel (SARP) made a 
recommendation for a quantitative definition of UAS well clear 
that uses distance and time functions similar to those used in the 
TCAS II resolution advisory logic [7]. For large, remotely 
piloted UAS, the RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) has 
developed minimum operational requirements for detect and 
avoid that uses SARP’s well-clear definition [8]. DAIDALUS 
[9] is a NASA developed software that serves as a reference 
implementation of the minimum operational performance 
standards for the UAS detect and avoid concept defined in 
RTCA FAA DO-365. The scope of the DAA requirements 
detailed in DO-365 is limited to large vehicles operating in 
controlled airspace. These requirements are not adequate for 
small sUAS operating in low altitude airspace. 
 Several researchers have investigated the sensing aspects of 
collision avoidance for small UAS. Surveillance performance of 
sensors required to perform SAA in small UAS with emphasis 
on risk was considered in [10]. That work provides a mapping 
between surveillance performance and collision risk. An 
analysis of the usage of radars for sense and avoid was provided 
in [11]. The use of ground-based radars to perform sense and 
avoid in a local area was investigated in [12]. Dolph et al. [13] 
used cameras to visually detect intruders in the vicinity. 
Acoustic sensors for intruder detection have also been used in 
[14]. Experimental evaluation of a rudimentary sense avoid 
algorithm was conducted in [15]. A survey of various sense and 
avoid algorithms for small UAS can be found in [16].  
Figure 1. ICAROUS architecture 
 
 
  
 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. ICAROUS  
ICAROUS is an architecture that integrates a collection of 
core algorithms for path planning, geofence handling, traffic 
avoidance, and decision-making capabilities to enable 
autonomous operation of UAS [17,18]. Fig. 1 provides an 
overview of the ICAROUS architecture, which uses NASA’s 
core Flight Systems (cFS) middleware. ICAROUS was designed 
to run on a companion computer while consuming data from an 
autopilot system. It monitors the autopilot system, mission 
performance, and other mission and safety constraints. 
ICAROUS assumes control of the vehicle when a constraint 
violation is imminent and autonomously implements resolution 
maneuvers to prevent conflicts and mitigate risk.  
B. DAIDALUS 
The sense and avoid functionality implemented within 
ICAROUS is provided by DAIDALUS [9]. DAIDALUS is a 
DAA software library available under NASA’s Open Source 
Agreement. DAIDALUS consists of algorithms that predict 
well-clear violations between the ownship and traffic aircraft 
and provide maneuver guidance in the form of ranges of 
maneuvers for the ownship to maintain or regain well clear. 
These algorithms have been formally verified for logical 
correctness in the Prototype Verification System (PVS). 
C. ICAROUS Resolutions for SAA 
The DAIDALUS detect and avoid library is highly 
configurable and uses a list of parameters that govern its 
response to an intruder in the airspace. The present work 
evaluates only the lateral resolutions provided by DAIDALUS. 
These lateral resolutions are in the form of track guidance and 
require the ownship to change its heading, but not its altitude. 
Given the position and velocity of intruder aircraft in the 
airspace, DAIDALUS outputs a range of track angles that could 
result in well-clear violation. These outputs are a function of the 
initial parameter set used to configure DAIDALUS. A list of all 
parameters used by DAIDALUS and detailed explanation of 
these parameters can be found in [18] For the ISAAC test, the 
effects of the following parameters were investigated. 
• Well-clear alerting time threshold – time before 
predicted well-clear violation to start avoidance 
maneuver 
• Well-clear distance threshold (DTHR) – horizontal 
distance to be maintained between ownship and traffic 
aircraft 
• Well-clear time threshold (TTHR) – This time threshold 
is related to the Modified Tau (TAUMOD) threshold 
used in the TCAS alerting logic and it provides an 
estimate to time of closest point of approach.  
The time when a resolution maneuver is computed depends 
both on the alerting time threshold and the well-clear thresholds. 
The sum of these time thresholds approximates the time prior to 
closest point of approach when the resolution maneuver is 
computed. In the present work, these times are varied in a way 
that their sum remains constants.   
When a conflict occurs, ICAROUS selects an avoidance 
maneuver from the guidance maneuver ranges computed by 
DAIDALUS and autonomously commands the autopilot to 
execute it. ICAROUS also constantly checks to see if the turn to 
intercept the original flight plan would cross a conflict track 
heading. ICAROUS initiates the return to path maneuver only 
when the vehicle is clear of a well-clear conflict and when 
returning to the original mission no longer results in loss of 
separation. Return to path can be implemented in multiple ways 
depending on the mission. The vehicle could return to the next 
waypoint in the current flight plan or, alternately, it could return 
to the point on the flight plan where it initially deviated to avoid 
loss of separation. For this work, return to path is treated as 
returning to the next waypoint in the current flight plan.  
D. Sensors for SAA in Small UAS 
The limited payload carrying capability of small UAS poses 
significant restrictions on the type of onboard traffic surveillance 
sensors that can be used for SAA. Currently available off-the-
shelf sensors suitable for SAA applications on small UAS 
include vehicle-to-vehicle communication devices and ADS-B 
for cooperative traffic, and airborne radars, LIDAR, vision-
based sensors (cameras), and acoustic sensors for non-
cooperative traffic. Ground based radars can also be used as a 
traffic surveillance source. Different sensor technologies have 
inherent capabilities and limitations, as well as varying 
performance metrics and operational constraints. ICAROUS 
was designed to be sensor agnostic, and configurable to adjust 
to different sensor performance and uncertainty ranges. Prior 
work conducted as part of the UTM Technology Capability 
Level 3 (TCL3) flight tests studied the suitability of vehicle to 
vehicle communication devices for sense and avoid [19]. 
This work specifically focuses on the use of the pingRX 
ADS-B receiver manufactured by uAvionix [20] for providing 
intruder position data (UAS-UAS and GA-UAS). The ping 
module is very light weight and integrates with a 
Pixhawk/ArduPilot flight controller [21].  
The pingRX is considered to be representative of the types 
of ADS-B receivers that could be used for sUAS applications. 
Internal vehicle communication of ADS-B data is sent via the 
ADSB_VEHICLE message of the MavLINK protocol [22] 
containing information about aircraft call sign, ICAO address, 
GPS coordinates (latitude and longitude), altitude, and vehicle 
velocity. The ISAAC test relies on ADS-B technology to assess 
the performance of ICAROUS autonomous SAA capability 
since its performance and accuracy exceed those of other sensor 
technologies. However, the of use ADS-B-based SAA for sUAS 
is usually not considered to be an acceptable solution since the 
increased volume of transmissions could overload and impair 
existing systems. M. Guterres et al. [24] found that the main 
  
factors that would impact ADS-B functionality are UAS fleet 
density and transmission power. To allow UAS fleet density to 
increase, reduced power ADS-B must be explored or another 
frequency spectrum be allocated for UAS use. Much research 
remains to be done to understand the potential applicability of 
low-power ADS-B for sUAS and its impact on the air traffic 
system.    
IV. METHOD 
A software in the loop (SITL) simulation capability was 
developed to study performance metrics of a large number of 
SAA configurations. The SITL integrates ICAROUS with a 
high-fidelity quad-rotor simulation model and an autopilot 
system through a MavLINK protocol. ICAROUS guidance 
commands are executed by the SITL simulator and relevant 
metrics are computed to characterize its performance. A wide 
range of SAA configurations were run, including well-clear 
distance thresholds ranging from 300 to 2000 feet, and alerting 
time thresholds ranging from 0 to 25 seconds. Preliminary 
analysis of the results was used to guide and down select the 
SAA configurations used in the ISAAC flight test. Flight test 
results validate simulation tests and further characterize the 
performance of the algorithms with real sensor data, winds, and 
turbulence, amidst various factors such as transmission latency, 
ADS-B packet drop outs and GPS errors 
A. Flight Test Approach 
A DJI S1000 octocopter with an ArduPilot autopilot system 
was used as the ICAROUS equipped ownship aircraft for these 
flight test. An onboard companion computer connected to the 
autopilot hosted the ICAROUS software that communicated 
with the autopilot via the MavLINK protocol. This setup is 
illustrated in Fig. 2.  
The flight test was conducted in two phases. For the first 
phase, UAS-to-UAS encounters, the intruder aircraft was a 
Tempest Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) [23]. For the second 
phase, UAS-to-GA aircraft encounters, the intruder was a Cirrus 
SR-22. Scenarios included encounters with two different 
geometries, head-on and at 90-degree angle. All flight tests were 
conducted at the Beaver Dam Air park located near Smithfield, 
VA, in the vicinity of multiple airports. As a result, ADS-B 
signals from multiple commercial planes were also present 
during testing. 
Flight safety requirements imposed several constraints on 
the encounter geometry whose impact warrants an explanation. 
Since both UAS had to be within visual-line-of-sight of the 
operators at all times, it was challenging to set up the test 
conditions with larger well clear distances and with encounters 
with high closure rate (as those involving a GA). Since in those 
cases the encounters start when the aircraft are in close 
proximity to the well-clear boundary, late detections are likely 
to occur. In those cases, the ownship may not have enough time 
to avoid the specified well-clear.  
1) Flight Test Setup 
The flight test comprised two phases: Phase 1 included UAS vs 
UAS encounters and Phase 2 UAS vs GA aircraft encounters. 
a) Phase 1: UAS vs UAS 
Fig. 3 illustrates the flight plans of the two aircraft for a head 
on encounter. On the left (shown in blue) is the flight path of the 
fixed-wing intruder (Tempest) aircraft. On the right (shown in 
yellow), is the flight path of the ownship (DJI S1000) vehicle. 
The intruder aircraft flew counter clockwise flights which 
generated a direct head-on collision hazard for the ownship. A 
500 foot boundary was established to separate the vehicles and 
mitigate risks of mid-air collisions.  
These flight paths are chosen so that the vehicles are 500 feet 
apart at the closest point if no autonomous traffic deconfliction 
maneuvering is performed. The two vehicles are set up to 
operate at roughly the same altitude. The intruder aircraft 
maintains a constant speed of 20 m/s throughout all encounters. 
The ownship maintains a constant speed of 10 m/s. Thus, the 
relative closure rate between the two vehicles for the head on 
encounters is 30 m/s (approximately 60 knots). This rate of 
closure is considered to be representative of nominal sUAS to 
sUAS encounters, but higher closure rates may be possible. 
Flight paths are chosen to maximize the likelihood of a predicted 
conflict between the two vehicles. In Fig. 3, a well-clear conflict 
should occur between the two vehicles during the southernmost 
leg of the flight plan.  
Flight paths for the 90-degree encounter are shown in Fig. 4. 
Once airborne, the Tempest intruder aircraft is flown up to its 
cruising altitude and its autopilot is engaged so that it continues 
to fly the programmed rectangular pattern. After the Tempest is 
established on its flight plan, the octocopter is launched and 
manually flown to waypoint X1. Once at waypoint X1, the 
octocopter loiters until the encounter can be initiated.  
 
Figure 2. Hardware setup 
 
Figure 3. Head on encounter UAV flight plans 
 
  
The encounter is initiated by engaging the Pixhawk's 
autopilot, triggering it to fly the programmed flight plan. An 
encounter initiated too soon can result in the octocopter 
completing the flight leg between waypoints X1 and X2 before 
observing a well-clear conflict. Similarly, an encounter initiated 
too late can result in the intruder completing its leg ahead of the 
ownship or the traffic deconfliction maneuver being initiated 
prior to reaching steady-state cruise conditions. An encounter 
initiated at the right timing results in the two vehicles 
approaching each other head on, leading to a well-clear conflict. 
Several trials were done to establish the timing to produce a well 
clear. The distance of the intruder from waypoint Y1 can be used 
to time encounters consistently. The exact timing depends on the 
well-clear radius, alerting time of the detect and avoid 
configurations used by ICAROUS, and prevailing winds and 
needs to be adjusted throughout testing. Fig. 5 shows an example 
of detect and avoid response from a head on encounter. 
The octocopter's autopilot is engaged at point X1, when the 
corresponding position of the intruder is near point Y1. Once the 
ownship's autopilot is engaged, it starts accelerating towards its 
next waypoint, X2. At point t1 a well-clear conflict is predicted 
and ICAROUS assumes control of the ownship's autopilot. 
ICAROUS issues guidance commands to direct the ownship 
away from the well-clear conflict. ICAROUS continues this 
heading guidance until it is safe to return to the mission. The 
computation of the return to path maneuver is discussed in 
Section III. At point t3, the ownship is safe to return to the 
original mission and ICAROUS starts guiding the aircraft 
towards the next waypoint, X2.  
b) UAS vs GA 
The flight paths for the manned aircraft are shown in Fig. 6. 
Note that for tests involving a well-clear radius of 2000 feet, the 
flight path of the GA aircraft is offset by 1000 feet. This is 
mainly to restrict the deviations of the UAS to be within 1000 
feet in the pilot's line of sight. In these tests, the GA aircraft 
maintains a constant airspeed of 100 knots. The ownship 
maintains a constant speed of 10 m/s. Note that this setup results 
in a relative closure rate of 60 m/s in head-on encounters. Timing 
for encounter initiation is similar to the flight tests with a UAV 
intruder. Following the GA plane position on an ADS-B monitor 
helps to get the timing right. 
2) Tests with Geofences 
Flight tests also included scenarios with a simple keep-out 
geofence added either to the north or south of the ownship's 
flight plan to force deviations in specific directions. These 
geofences can be static, i.e. known before flight, or dynamic, i.e., 
provided during flight (also referred to as “dynamic 
restrictions”). In this setup, the ownship is expected to deviate 
away from the geofence while executing a traffic avoidance 
maneuver. These additional conditions were included to 
demonstrate ICAROUS integrated SAA-geofence containment 
capability.  
3) Reduced Power ADS-B 
During the flight tests described above, three levels of UAS 
ADS-B output power were tested: 
• 40 Watts (full power) 
• 1.3 Watts (15 decibel attenuation) 
 
Figure 4. 90-degree encounter UAV flight plans 
 
Figure 5. Example of DAA maneuver 
Figure 6. Flight plans for manned intruder 
 
  
• 0.4 Watts (20 decibel attenuation) 
The different output power levels were produced by adding 
a 50 Watt RF attenuator to the ADS-B transmitter on the UAV 
intruder (Tempest). By swapping out the attenuator between 
flights, different transmission powers were achieved. The output 
power for each scenario is estimated based on the 40 Watts 
nominal output of the antenna. 
B. Flight Test Conditions 
The ISAAC test conditions were designed to evaluate the 
impact of different well-clear volumes and alerting times used 
by the core avoidance logic. Table 1 enumerates the test 
conditions for both the UAS-UAS and UAS-GA encounters.  
Each condition is repeated several times (runs) for different 
well-clear configurations. As explained earlier, the encounter 
geometries were constrained by the flight safety requirements as 
well as the test site limits. Hence, only 1000 and 2000 feet of 
horizontal separation were tested. Also, at most 20 seconds of 
total alerting time + TTHR time were tested. The choice of 
alerting time (i.e., time at which maneuver guidance is first 
computed prior to well-clear violation) and TTHR (i.e., well-
clear time threshold based on aircraft closure rate) values was 
informed by simulation results.  
Only lateral avoidance maneuvers are considered for this 
effort. Lateral maneuvers require the ownship to change 
heading, but not altitude, to maintain separation with the 
intruders. In both phases of flight testing, the intruders do not 
react to the ownship and continue on their respective flight plans. 
Additional maneuvers are being explored as part of ongoing 
work. 
 Fig. 7 summarizes the impact alerting time, well-clear 
radius, and time threshold on the horizontal miss distance at the 
closest point of approach during the different encounters.  
In the graphs, a horizontal miss distance smaller than the 
horizontal well-clear radius indicates a loss of separation, while 
a separation distance greater than the well-clear radius indicates 
a conservative avoidance maneuver. 
V. RESULTS 
A. ICAROUS Performance 
There were 42 successful runs, 16 UAS-UAS and 26 UAS-
GA encounters. The UAS-UAS encounters experienced no 
losses of separation regardless of horizontal separation or 
combination of alerting and threshold time parameters used. 
This may indicate that for low closing speeds (< 30 m/s) the 
configurations chosen are safe and possible overly conservative. 
Of the 26 UAS-GA encounters there were 16 losses of 
separation, with intrusion distances ranging from 14 feet to 1000 
feet. The data shows that all but 1 of the losses was related to the 
test site constraints and the choice of parameters that proved to 
Figure 7. Horizontal Miss Distance for all Horizontal Distance, Alerting 
and Threshold time test parameters 
TABLE 1. TEST CONDITIONS 
Intruder 
Type DTHR 
Alerting 
Time (s) 
TTHR 
(s) 
Encounter 
Type Runs 
GA 1000 20 0 Head On 3 
GA 1000 10 10 Head On 2 
GA 1000 20 0 90 deg 1 
GA 1000 10 10 90 deg 3 
GA 2000 20 0 Head On 2 
GA 2000 10 10 Head On 3 
GA 2000 0 20 Head On 3 
GA 2000 20 0 90 deg 3 
GA 2000 10 10 90 deg 3 
GA 2000 0 20 90 deg 3 
UAS 1000 20 0 Head On 6 
UAS 1000 10 10 Head On 2 
UAS 1000 0 20 90 deg 3 
UAS 2000 10 10 90 deg 5 
 
 
  
be insufficient for the closing speeds of the GA-UAS 
encounters. In those cases, the SAA equipped UAS was 
initialized too close to the well clear boundary or in some cases, 
already in a loss of separation. However, the data seems to 
indicate that the alerting time component is more consequential 
than TTHR resulting in fewer losses of separation. The most 
successful set of runs corresponds to 2000 feet of horizontal 
separation and 20 seconds of alerting time.  
Analysis of the remaining case shows an anomaly in the 
system, possibly related to an autopilot condition that caused the 
UAS to slow down as the encounter progressed. After the UAS 
reaches the commanded speed of 10 m/s in autonomous mode, 
it unexpectedly and abnormally decreases the speed to 0.53 m/s. 
The GA aircraft is flying in the direction of the UAV at a speed 
of 54.5 m/s (106 knots). According to configuration parameters, 
maneuver guidance is computed by ICAROUS 21 seconds prior 
to CPA when the aircraft have a horizontal separation of 3763 
feet (1147m). Given the performance limits of the UAS, 
ICAROUS does not find a track resolution for the UAS. It does 
find ground speed and vertical resolutions, but they are not 
currently integrated into the decision-making logic. The UAS, 
still in autonomous mode, slowly accelerates. The first track 
resolution autonomously implemented by the UAS is computed 
by ICAROUS 16 seconds prior to CPA. At this time the aircraft 
have a separation of 2827.73 feet (862m). The UAS does not 
have enough time to avoid a loss of separation and passes 758.68 
ft (231 m) from the GA aircraft. 
B. ADS-B Sensor Performance 
1) ADS-B for UAS Sense and Avoid 
The pingRX ADS-B receiver used in these tests provides a 
simple practical way to incorporate ADS-B data into UAS sense 
and avoid operations and is considered to be representative of 
future devices that could be used for commercial UAS 
operations. In our tests, the pingRX was able to successfully 
decode greater than 90% of the ADS-B messages sent by the 
intruder UAV aircraft at full transmission power (40 W). 
Slightly better results were seen from the GA plane, with greater 
than 95% of ADS-B messages successfully received. Since this 
analysis was performed using telemetry logs from the ownship 
ground station, some of these missed updates could be attributed 
to lost packets in the telemetry link, which would not affect the 
amount of ADS-B data available to ICAROUS. However, 
analysis shows that fewer than 2% of packets were dropped over 
the telemetry link. In addition, packets lost due to drops out of 
the telemetry link would be assumed to affect all ADS-B 
transmission power levels and aircraft types (UAS vs GA). 
When using the pingRX, parameters such as ADS-B range 
filter and maximum number of ADS-B targets passed on to the 
autopilot system need to be carefully selected for each 
application. Otherwise, messages from the target intruder 
aircraft may be dropped due to the pingRX being overloaded 
with aircraft in the general vicinity. During testing it was 
observed that the pingRX was receiving ADS-B data from 
aircraft more than 50 miles away. The pingRX also performed 
less reliably when subjected to large vibrations in flight. Periods 
of high vibration appeared to coincide with gaps in ADS-B 
reception of up to 10 seconds. These issues should be understood 
and accounted for before using ADS-B and the pingRX for 
safety critical UAS operations. 
ICAROUS performed successful SAA maneuvers using 
ADS-B input from the pingRX for more than 30 flight tested 
encounters. The range of full power ADS-B has no effect on 
small UAS operations, as the lookahead time and alerting time 
parameters in ICAROUS limit the monitored range to be much 
smaller than the actual range of ADS-B reception. The few 
encounters where ICAROUS failed to maintain well clear were 
not caused by ADS-B errors, but were due to well-clear 
definition and timing parameters that were inappropriate for the 
scenario being tested. For example, alerting time was too small 
to alert ICAROUS of an incoming aircraft with enough time to 
complete the required maneuver.  
These tests demonstrate the use of ADS-B for sUAS in 
scenarios involving both unmanned and manned aircraft. Any 
ADS-B receiver needs to be carefully integrated and tested 
before use in safety critical applications. 
 
2) Reduced Power ADS-B 
ICAROUS performed successful detect and avoid 
maneuvers at three different ADS-B output power levels. Even 
with the lowest power (0.4 Watt) signal, 83% of ADS-B 
messages were received by the pingRX unit within the 0-1200 
meters separation range tested. This reception rate proved 
sufficient for ICAROUS avoidance maneuvers within this 
range.  
Fig. 8 shows a logistic regression between the probability of 
ADS-B message reception and separation range between the two 
vehicles. The regression shows how increasing distance between 
the two vehicles reduces the probability that a transmitted ADS-
B message will be successfully received by the ownship. Each 
received message is associated with the distance between the 
two vehicles at the time the message was sent, based on ownship 
GPS position and intruder ADS-B data. The missed messages 
are estimated based on the standard once per second broadcast 
rate, and associated with the approximate distance between the 
two vehicles at the time of expected transmission. For the full 
power signal, the range between vehicles does not significantly 
 
Figure 8. Probability of pingRX successfully receiving a 0.4 Watt output 
ADS-B message, dependence on separation range 
  
affect the probability of message reception (p = 0.125 > 0.05) 
within the tested range. For the 1.3 Watt signal, the range 
significantly affects the probability of message reception (p = 
0.015 < 0.05). For the 0.4 Watt attenuated signal, the effect is 
highly significant (p < 0.0001 < 0.05). This is expected for 
reduced power transmissions. 
A 70% reception corresponds to an expected 2-3 seconds 
between messages. As the vehicles get closer together, this 
reception rate increases. These tests indicate that these message 
reception rates are sufficient for UAS avoidance maneuvers, 
even at the greatly reduced transmitting power. M. Guterres et 
al. [24] concluded that UAV ADS-B transmit power within 
0.01-0.1 Watts, coupled with a fleet density less than 5 UAVs 
per square kilometer is required to maintain acceptable ATM 
message reception rates of greater than 80%. The current test 
evaluated only single aircraft and testing of multiple aircraft in 
higher-density operations is required to establish the actual 
upper power limit. The lowest output power tested in this effort 
was 0.4 Watts which is above the suggested criteria yet provides 
minimum required performance. It is feasible that the sensitivity 
of the pingRX unit could be improved, but that was beyond the 
scope of the current effort. Lower transmission powers that fall 
within this range should be tested in future efforts. In addition to 
achieving adequate performance for UAS to UAS applications, 
results for UAS to GA aircraft were also adequate. Observations 
from the manned GA SR-22 aircraft revealed that for the mid-
power level the position of the intruder Tempest aircraft was 
observed more than 15 miles away. When the Tempest ADS-B 
power output was attenuated to ~400 mWatts, its location was 
observed consistently by the GA aircraft from at least 8 miles 
away. This distance is equivalent to approximately 4 minutes 
warning time for the GA aircraft. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A successful maneuver to avoid a well-clear conflict is 
largely a function of the performance of the aircraft and position 
communication link. Factors such as the speed and turn rate of 
the vehicle play a significant role in maneuvering to avoid an 
approaching intruder and also affect the required range of 
position communication link performance. Consequently, 
careful consideration of the parameters chosen for well clear is 
crucial. These parameters must be chosen to handle the fastest 
intruder in a given airspace. 
The phase 1 flight tests with the Tempest aircraft resulted in 
closure rates of 30 m/s during head on encounters and 22 m/s 
during the 90-degree encounters. With a turn rate of 10 
degrees/second, and a top speed of 10 m/s, the octocopter was 
able to maneuver fast enough to avoid a well-clear violation 
defined by the configuration parameters.  
Proper selection of parameters depends on many factors 
including intruder speed, desired separation radius, and ownship 
limitations in turn rate and speed. Conservatively chosen 
parameters will reduce the risk of a well-clear violation, but 
consume more time and fuel as the ownship executes long 
maneuvers that are not necessarily required to maintain safe 
separation. On the other hand, if parameters are chosen to 
maximize efficiency, the ownship may lose well clear during 
encounters with higher speed vehicles. A well-clear definition 
and parameters must be chosen carefully for each application 
and be based on actual assessments of the risk of vehicle 
collisions. Values evaluated herein were considered nominal and 
appeared very conservative to ground observers. The results of 
these tests characterize ICAROUS’ performance under different 
configurations and inform the effective selection of parameters 
for future operations. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. Development of ICAROUS 
The ICAROUS capability for autonomous SAA was 
designed as a distributed software architecture based on well-
established communication protocols and developed using 
formally verified SAA algorithms. ICAROUS has been 
undergoing extensive simulation evaluations as well as flights to 
evaluate its performance in real flight conditions.  
The ISAAC flight test was designed to explore the 
performance of the autonomous SAA functionality in conflict 
encounters of a UAS with both another UAS and a GA aircraft. 
The flights were conducted on days with mild wind conditions. 
Performance was measured in terms of horizontal miss distance 
as a function of well clear horizontal separation, alerting, and 
threshold times.  
Results from this test indicate that ICAROUS autonomous 
SAA capability was very effective in maintaining separation 
between two UAS in mild wind conditions, with closing speeds 
not exceeding 30 m/s, and for all combination of alerting and 
threshold times and distance parameters used. Results from the 
UAS-GA encounters were impacted by the constraints of the 
ISAAC test design that did not allow some of the test conditions 
to be initialized properly, causing late detections and losses of 
separation. However, within the limits of the test conditions, 
results seem to indicate that at closing speeds in the order of 100 
knots an alerting time of 20 sec and a separation threshold of 
2000 feet was effective for all tested encounters. 
The ISAAC test was the first flight test designed to shed light 
over this complex and wide-ranging problem and, clearly, there 
remains work to be done. Future flight studies need to explore 
the parameter space beyond the ISAAC limits and to 
characterize the performance of other sensor technologies for 
SAA to determine if it can support such applications. 
B. Attenuated ADS-B Output for UAVs 
These tests demonstrate that low powered, 0.4 Watt, ADS-B 
transmission is a practical option for UAV to UAV applications. 
The output powers tested provided sufficient quality and range 
for ICAROUS to perform consistent detect and avoid 
encounters. Reduced power should decrease the risk of 
frequency congestion that would interrupt normal ADS-B use, 
but may require lower transmit powers than tested here. In 
addition, further work is needed to understand the potential 
impact of high density low-power transmissions on ground 
receivers and multilateration systems. 
  
Future tests should assess the 0.01 to 0.1 Watt transmission 
power suggested by [24]. Tests should also be conducted over 
larger separation distances and examine the impact that several 
UAVs transmitting at this low power would have on ATM ADS-
B operations, especially the impact of a fleet of UAVs operating 
at or near an airport. 
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